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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN T. CURNUTTE,
Plat"vntiff and Respondent,
-vs.UTAH GAS SERVICJ1_j COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant,
ERMA RANSDELL, doing business
as THE LARIAT CAFE,
Defendant and Appellant.
JUNE CURNUTTE,
Plaint~ff and Respondent,
-vs.UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant,
ERMA RANSDELL, doing business
as THE LARIAT CAFE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

8971

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the
record. The parties will be referred to here as they
appeared in the trial court.)
STATEMENT OF CASE
We will answer the· points in the Brief of Appellant
in the order in which they are there set forth. Generally
the facts recited in the brief are sufficient. We will
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refer to any additional facts under the specific point
where they may become material.
Our contention is that within Rule 56 (c) L"tah Rules
of Civil Procedure there was no genuine issue as to any
1naterial fact and therefore the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the
issue of liability. See Holbrook v. Websters Inc., 7 utah
2d 148, 320 P. 2d 661 (1958), Abdulloadir v. Western
PacifVc R. R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, Holland v.
Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 rtah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700,
Jlatiu,itch vs. Hercules Powder Co., 3 L"tah 2d 283, 282
P. 2d 1044, Ulibarri v. Christenson, :2 17tah 2d 367, 275 P.
2d 170, Jlorri·s v. FarnSU'Orth Jlotel, 1:23 rtah 289, 259
P. 2d 297, Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 6-1:6, :2±4 P. :2d 862.
The defendant in her pleadings has admitted the
LTtah Gas Service Company was negligent in installing
its gas pipes at the Lariat Cafe and in disconnecting
the propane gas lines therefrom. It has admitted that
this negligence was the proxnnate cause of the injuries
received by plaintiff June Curnutte and of the death
of Hoberta Lynn Curnutte.
It appears frmn the record without dispute that
defendant operated the Lariat Cafe and invited the public to cmne into her place of business. ~\lso, it appears
from her deposition that she en1ployed the Utah Gas
Service Cmupany to install gas pipes in her cafe in order
that she might use gas in conducting her business. The
propane lines being in use, it w·as necessary, in performing th i R installation to disconnect thmn.
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All the above facts are not in dispute. The question
of whether or not this negligence of the gas company
should be imputed to defendant is not a question of fact
but one of law and under the authorities this negligence
should be imputed to the defendant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL IS
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF UTAH GAS
PANY IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE
PIPES AND IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
LINES.

RESPONSIBLE
SERVICE COMNATURAL GAS
PROPANE GAS

POINT II
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HER ANSWER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL IS
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF UTAH GAS
PANY IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE
PIPES AND IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
LINES.

RESPONSIBLE
SERVICE COMNATURAL GAS
PROPANE GAS

The best statement of the principles upon which
plaintiffs rely for recovery is stated in Prosser on Torts
(2d Ed.) 357 as follows:
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"The employer of an independent contractor
may be liable for any negligence of his own in
connection with the work to be done. But the
common law 'rule' has been that he is not liable
vicariously for the torts of the contractor. To
this rule certain 'exceptions' have been developed,
which indicate a tendency to place the contractor
upon the same footing as a servant. The more
i1nportant exceptions are :
''a. Where the employer is under a duty to
the plaintiff which the law considers
that he is not free to delegate to the
contractor.
''b. Where the work to be done is inherently
dangerous to others, or will be dangerous unless particular precautions are
taken.
·•Even under these exceptions, it is commonly
held that the employer will be liable only
for risks inherent in the work itself, and
not for 'collateral' negligence of the contractor."
The case at bar comes within both of these so-called
'·'pxceptions." Prosser further states on the smne page:
"Against this argument (of no control- no
vicarious liability), it has been contended that the
enterprise is still the employer's, since he remains
the person pri1narily to be benefited by it; that he
selects the contractor, and is free to insist upon
one who is financially responsible, and to demand
indemnity from hi1n, and that the insurance necessary to distribute the risk is properly a cost of his
business. Upon this basis, the prediction has been
made that ultimately the 'general rule' will be
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that the employer is liable for the negligence of
an independent contractor, and that he will be
excused only in a limited group of cases where he
is not in a position to select a ·responsible contractor, or the risk of any harm to others from
the enterprise is obviously slight. The English
courts have taken steps in this direction, until the
position of the ordinary independent contractor
approaches that of a servant. The American
courts, while they have not gone so far, have
whittled away at the rule of non-liability with
exceptions, to the point where it is not easy to sa~
that any 'general rule' remains."
We will consider the admitted facts and the authorities under each one of these so called exceptions.

Non-Delegable Duty
Under the indisputed facts in this case, defendant
had a non-delegable duty to her patrons to keep and
maintain the premises of the Lariat Cafe in a reasonably
safe condition. She could not delegate this duty to anyone. There can be no question that maintenance of the
gas pipes and their proper installation would be a part
of this non-delegable duty. The defendant was operating
a public place and inviting members of the public to come
in and eat at her cafe. She thereby assumed this obligation.

Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.) 359, states the rule as
follows:
"Again, it has been held in many instances
that the employer's enterprise, and his relation to
the plaintiff~ is such as to impose upon him a duty
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which cannot be delegated to the contractor. It
has been mentioned earlier thaf there are numerous situations in which it may be negligence to
rely upon another person, and the defendant is
not relieved of the obligation of taking reasonable
precautions himself. But the cases of 'non-delegable duty' go further, and hold the employer
liable for the negligence of the contractor, although he has himself done everything that could
reasonably be required of him. They are thus
cases of vicarious liability. Such a duty may be
imposed by statute, by contract, by franchise or
charter, or by the common law. The catalogue is
a long one: the duty of a carrier to transport its
passengers in safety, of a railroad to fence its
tracks properly or to n1aintain safe crossings, and
of a municipality to keep its streets in repair; the
duty to afford lateral support to adjoining land,
to refrain from obstructing or endangering the
public highway, to keep premi,ses reasonably safe
for business visitors, to provide employees ~rith a
safe place to work, and many others. It is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the nondelegable character of such duties may be determined, other than the conclusion of the courts that
the responsibility is so important to the comInunity that the employer should not be permitted
to transfer it to another. So far as they
may be willing to broaden the category in the
future, the law may approach an ultimate rule
that any duty which can be found to rest upon
the employer himself cannot be delegated to an
independent contractor."
The rule is stated in 2 Harper & James, The Law of

Torts, § 26.11, page 1406, as follows:
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"There are also situations wherein the law
views a person's duty as so important and so
peremptory that it will be treated as non-delegable. Defendants who are under such a duty
' ... cannot, by employing a contractor, get rid of
their own duty to other people, whatever that duty
may be.'"

* * *
"Smne common law duties are also non-delegable. Thus the landlord's duty of care to keep
the common approaches in reasonable condition
. for several tenants, and the land occupier's duty
of care to keep the premises reasonably safe for
invitees or for adjacent owners or highway travelers, may not be avoided by the employment of
independent contractors. In all these cases thE>
employer is as liable for the conduct of the contractor as though it were his own."
The principle relied upon is also set forth in 2 Restatement of the La.w of Torts, § 425, as follows:

"One who employs an independent contractor
to maintain in safe condition
(a) land which he holds open to the entry of
the public as his place of business, or
(b) a chattel which he supplies for others to
use for his business purposes or which
he leases for immediate use,
is subject to the same liability for bodily harm
caused by the contractor's negligent failure to
maintain the land or chattel in reasonably safe
condition, as though he had retained its maintenance in his own hands/'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Two of the illustrative cases show that this section
is particularly applicable to the case at bar:

"1. A operates a department store. He employs the B Elevator Company to repair his elevators therein. Due to the negligence of the B
Company, the elevator is dangerously defective.
It falls and harms C who has come to buy and
D who has come to the shop to look over the goods
displayed. A is subject to liability to C and D.
''2. A operates a hotel. He employs B as a
plumber to install a shower bath. B negligently
transposes the handles so that the hot water pipe
is labeled cold. C, a guest, deceived by the label,
turns on the hot water and is scalded. A is subject to liability to C."
8 ectton 422 also applies this same principle:
·•A possessor of land who entrusts the repair
of a building or other structure thereon to an
independent contractor is subject to the same liability to persons within or outside the land who
are injured by the contractor's negligent failure to
put or maintain the building or structure in reasonably safe condition as though he had retained
the making of the repairs in his own hands.''

It is stated in the comment at Page 1138 as follows:

"* * * The duty which a possessor of land owes
to others to put and n1aintain it in reasonably safe
condition is nondelegable. If an independent contractor, no matter how carefully selected; is employed to perform it, the possessor is answ·erable
for harm caused by the negligent failure of his
contractor to put or maintain the buildings and
structures in reasonably safe condition, irrespecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tive of whether the contractor's negligence lies in
his incompetence, carelessness, inattention or
delay."
The following cases recognize and apply the principle here contended for by plaintiff. Knell v. Morris,
39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P. 2d 352 (1952), Brown v. George
Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929
(1943), Bazzo.Z~ v. Nance's SaniftariJum, 109 Cal. App. 2d.
232, 240 P. 2d 672 (1952) Oourtell v. McEachen, (Cal.
.App.) 315 P. 2d 351 (1957), Myers v. Lilttle Church By
The Side of the Road, 37 Wash. 2d 397, 227 P. 2d 165,
(1951), Snyder v. Southern California Edison Co., 44 Cal.
2d 793, 285 P. 2d 912 (1955), Grimnell v. OarbiJde & Oarbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535, Bailey
v. Zlotnick, 149 F. 2d 505 (DC-1945), Lilienthal v. Hastimgs Olo,tht"ng Co., 131 Cap. App. 2d 343, 280 P. 2d 824
(1955); Gvll v. Krussner, 11 N.J. Super. 10, 77 A. 2d 462
(1950).
We submit that all of the foregoing cases are authorities in favor of plaintiffs' position. We will review
and quote from only a part of them.
In the Knell case, supra, a non-suit was reversed.
Plaintiff owned a luggage store and the floor above was
occupied by defendant MacMar, Inc. It had a water
heater which began to leak. Defendant Morris, a plumber, was called to fix it. He used a radiator compound,
left the heater going, and it leaked, causing plaster in
plaintiff's place of business to fall. In reversing thisdismissal the court stated:
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"Inasmuch as the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding that Morris was negligent, it
was error to grant a nonsuit as to MacMar, Inc.
The fact that Morris was acting in the capacity of
an independent contractor does not necessarily
absolve the corporation from liability. The general rule of nonliability of an employer for the
acts of an independent contractor is subject to
numerous exceptions. See Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929;
McCordic v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d. 1, 142 P. 2d 7;
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 ·Cal. 2d 594,
110 P. 2d 1044; Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212
Cal. 622, 299 P. 720; Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal.
162, 103 P. 886; Rest., Torts, §§ 410-429; Prosser
on Torts, 1933, p. 645 et seq.; 23 A.L.R. 984.
There is evidence in the present case which is
sufficient to support finding in favor of plaintiffs
under at least one of these exceptions, and it is
unnecessary for us to consider whether MacMar
may be liable under any other theory.
"It is well settled that the possessor of land
is answerable for the negligent failure of an independent contractor to put or maintain buildings
and structures thereon in reasonably safe condition. See Rest., Torts, § ±22. This principle was
recently applied in Brown v. George Pepperdine
Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929, to hold
the owner of premises liable for the defectivf
condition of an elevator."
In the Bazzoli case, supra, an action was brought t
recover for personal injuries. Defendant en1ployed plaii
tiff to put an additional layer on the floor in defendanf
building. Defendant agreed to chip the first layer G
cement so the second layer would stick and it employed
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one Grimsley to do this. Plaintiff went upon the floor
to pour the cement, his leg went through the floor and into
a reservoir of scalding water underneath. Judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed. Defendant argued that Grimsley
was an independent contractor. Following the Brown
case, supra, the court stated:
"Even though we were able to
appellant's contention that Grimsley
dependent contractor, this would not
pellant from its obligation and duty
invitee as hereinbefore set forth."

agree with
was an inrelieve aptoward an

In the Lilienthal case, supra, a clothing store owner
and an independent contractor that waxed the store floor
were sued for personal injuries received by plaintiff who
fell on the floor. Judgment for defendants was reversed
for errors in the instructions. The court stated :
"The questioned instruction included the following advice : 'If a person does work for another,
as an independent contractor, then under the law
the person for whom the work was done is not
responsible or liable for any act done by such
independent contractor.'
"In many cases that would be a correct statement, but not in this case. A store owner does not
discharge his full duty toward business invitees by
delegating care of the premises to an independent
contractor. 'It is well settled that the possessor
of land is answerable for the negligent failure of
an independent contractor to put or maintain
buildings and structures thereon in reasonably
safe condition.' Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450,
456, 247 P. 2d 352, ·355. See also Brown v. George
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Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 143
P. 2d 929; McCordie v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d 1,
142 P. 2:d 7; Restatement of the Law of Torts,
§ 422."
We submit that the negligence of the Utah Gas Service Company an independent contractor, is imputable to
defendant Erma Ransdell on the grounds that her duty
to her patrons and members of the public was nondelegable. It was the same as though defendant herself negligently installed and disconnected the gas pipes.
Inherently Dangerous
The installation and removal of gas lines is inherently dangerous to others and certainly would be dangerous unless particular precautions are taken to prevent
leakage.
Both natural gas and propane gas have explosive
propensities. If they are permitted to leak in buildings
they accumulate and any spark or flame may touch off
an explosion. Gas must be handled with care to prevent
this from happening. Hence the work which defendant
employed Utah Gas Service Company to do comes within
this so called exception to the rule insulating an employer
of an independent contractor from liability. The acts of
the Gas Company in installing and removing the gas
lines became the acts of defendant and since negligently
performed, she is liable for the resulting damages. Prosser on Torts ( 2d Ed.) 360, 2 Harper and James, The
Law of Torts § 26.11, page 1408.
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The rule is stated in 27 A.m. Jur. 515, Independent
Contractors, section 38, as follows:
"It is well settled that one who orders work
to be executed, from which, in the natural course
of things, injurious consequences must be expected to arise unless means are adopted by which
such consequences may be prevented, is bound to
see that necessary steps are taken to prevent the
mischief, and such person cannot relieve himself
of his responsibility by employing someone else,
whether the contractor employed to do the work
from which the danger arises or some third person, to do what is necessary to prevent the work
from becoming wrongful. This rule is sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace, not only work which,
from its descriptions, is 'inherently' or 'intrinsically dangerous,' but also work which will, in the
ordinary course of events, occasion injury to
others if certain precautions are omitted, but
which may, as a general rule, be executed with
safety if those precautions are adopted."
The principle is thus propounded in 2 Restatement
of Law of Torts, § 427:

"One who employs an independent contractor
to do work which is inherently dangerous to others
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
them by the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm resulting from the
dangerous character of the work."
This Court recognized the dangerous characteristics
of gas in Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah
496, 108 P. 2d 254, (1940) when it stated:
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"It is true that as a supplier of a dangerous
substance a gas company is bound to high degree
of care * * *."
The courts generally recognize the highly dangeroni'
character of gas and its tendency to escape. See Annotation 26 A.L.R. 2d 136 at 146. This same view is taken
of butane gas. Annotation 17 A.L.R. 2d 880 at 88'1.
Applications of this exception or principle may be
found in the following cases: Burke v. Thomas (Okl.),
313 P. 2d 1082 (1957) ; Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331,
128 P. 2d 856 (1932); Thompson-Cadillac Co. v. Matthews, 173 Wash. 353,\23 P. 2d 399 (1933); Pendergrass
v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P. 2d 231 (1953); Fegles
Construction Co. v. McLaughlin Constructi:an Co., 205 F.
2d 637 (9CCA-1953).
We submit that installation and removal of the gas
pipes were such operations that from their very nature
injurious consequences could be expected unless n1eans
were adopted to avoid those consequences. The installation and removal of pipe are fraught "ith potentialities
of danger to any persons who might be in and about the
cafe. Hence the negligence of the gas cmnpany is inlputable to defendant under this principle.

BRIEF OF APPELLA.A'T
We will here undertake to answer the arguments
made by defendant in her brief in the order in whieh
they there appear.
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Non-Liability of Employer of
Independent Contractor
(Brief of Appellant, page 11)
Defendant asserts that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the
independent contractor, contending that our Supreme
Court has recently so held in Morley v. Rodman, 7 Utah
2d 299, 323 P. 2d 717.
The issue presented in the case at bar was not before
the court in the Morley case. No contention was made
that the defendant owner of the automobile would be
liable for the negligent acts of the driver even if he
were an independent contractor. It was apperently conceded by the parties that if the driver were an independent contractor there would be no liability on the part of
the owner.
The facts of the Morley case would not bring it
within any of the exceptions mentioned in the Restatement, Prosser, or Harper and James heretofore cited.
Defendant also quotes from Prosser (2d Ed.) p. 143
§ 32 under the subject Negligence-Standard of Conduct.

The footnote, as might be expected, refers to the section
where the subject Independent Contractors is discussed
(Section 64, p. 357). These latter rules are the ones
applicable and it clearly appears that the case at bar
comes within the "exceptions" to the rule that an employer is insulated from liability for the negligent acts
of an independent contractor. As stated by Prosser (2d
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Ed.) 358 the "exceptions" recognized by the courts have
reached a point where it is doubtful there is any so called
"general rule" of non-liability.
Duty of Owner or Occupier of Premises

(Brief of Appellant, pages 11-16)
We do not quarrel with the rules announced by the
authorities in this portion of the defendant's memorandum.
This is not a case of a plaintiff slipping on the floor
of defendant's cafe and a reliance on negligence of the
defendant herself (DeWeese v. J. C. Penny Co., 5 Utah
2d 116, 297 P. 2d 898; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah
· 2d 356, 284 P. 2d 477; Pennock v. Newhouse Realty Co.,
97 Utah 408, 93 P. 2d 482).
This is a case of negligent installation of gas pipe~
and negligent removal of propane lines permitting gas
to escape and causing an explosion. The defendant Erma
Ransdell, through a company for whose acts she was
responsible, negligently installed and removed gas pipes.
If an occupier of premises herself should undertake
to install or remove gas pipes and did it negligently so
that an explosion occurred causing injury to plaintiff the
rules announced under this portion of defendant's brief
would not insulate her against liability. It 'viii not do to
say in the case at bar defendant didn't do it personally
because under the exceptions here applicable she is r(>sponsible for the acts of the installer and remover.
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Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Company, 187 Ky. 578,
219 S.W. 1066, 10 A.L.R. 238 (1920), is not in point. The
tenant moved out of the premises and either a person
employed by him or someone unknown left the gas cock
open causing gas to fill the apartment, which exploded
when plaintiff lit a match on entering. The court specifically pointed out the gas cock was not left open by
anyone who was under the control of or "connected"
with the defendant landlord. That case is a far cry from
a situation where a company is employed by the occupier
of the premises to install and remove gas pipes and it
does so negligently, particularly if the general public is
invited to the premises involved.
Defendant again sets up a straw man and knocks it
down when she emphasizes that the occupier of the
premises is not an insurer of the safety of persons invited to enter. Plaintiffs do not contend for any such
rule. The contention is a simple one which defendant
does not, and cannot, meet. It is simply that defendant
Erma Ransdell is responsible for the negligent acts of
the gas company in installing and removing gas pipes
from premises to which she invited the public and the
installation and removal of which are dangerous unless
special precautions are taken.

Gleason Case
(Brief of Appellant, pages 16-18)
.Defendant cites and quotes from Gleason v. Salt
Lake City,·94 Utah l; 74 P. 2d 1225 (1937). .and contends
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that this caseis autho,rity against plaintiff. That case is
not in point. The quotation on page 18 of Brief of Appellant discloses the vast distinction between that case and
the case at bar. There can be no contention here that
defendant could not anticipate that the gas company was
going to install the pipes and remove the lines and that
in so doing special precautions would have to be taken
to avoid danger to persons coming into the cafe. Also
in that case the condition was not one on the inside of
defendant's place of business and where defendant invited members of the public to come. Also, there is a vast
difference between handling a hose for water and pipes
for a substance with the dangerous characteristics of gas.
The following quotation in that case from Ohio

Southern R. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 K.E. 269,
shows that this Court did not have in mind a case such
as the one at bar:
"One who causes work to be done is not liable,
ordinarily, for injuries that result from carelessness in its performance by the en1ployes of an
independent contractor, to whom he has let the
work, without reserving to himself any control
over the execution of it. But this principle has no
application where a resulting injury, instead of
being collateral and flowing from the negligent
act of the employe alone, is one that might have
been anticipated as a direct or probable consequence of the performance of the work contracted
for, if reasonable care is omitted in the course of
its performance. In such case, the perso-n causing
the work to be done will be liable, though the
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negligence is that of an employe of an independent
contractor.''
The case at bar comes within the exception here
referred to.

Inherently Dangerous
(Brief of .Appellant, page 18-20)
Defendant takes the position that there was nothing
dangerous about the installation of pipes because there
was no gas in them and hence this case does not come
within the exception contended for by plaintiff.
This overlooks the obvious. If no gas was to be put
In the pipes, then of course the work would not be
dangerous. But that is not the case here. Everyone knew
and anticipated that gas would be put in the pipes. This
latter fact is the one that made the work dangerous to
others if proper precautions were not taken.
Paraphrasing the language of Prosser (page 357),
this work would be dangerous to others unless particular
precautions were taken against leakage because gas was
going to be run through the pipes. If gas leaked there
would· be a likelihood of accumulation and explosion. If
the propane lines were not properly removed there also
was the likelihood of a dangerous accumulation of propane, gas and an explosion.
We cannot just consider the mere physical work of
installing and removing pipes. .An inseparable part of
this work was' that it was performed so that gas could
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be used in. the cafe. and_ of_ necessity. run .through these
pipes.

Restatement, Section 415
(Brief of Appellant, pages 20-21)
Plaintiff does not contend that this principle of law
applies here. Becauseit is inapplicable does not eliminate from this case the principles enunciated in sections
422, 425 and 427. For liability to be present under section 415 of course those elements set forth in the italicized
portion of the quote on page 21 must be present but the)'
need not be present for sections 422, 425 and 427 to
apply.
We assert the negligent acts of the gas company are
imputable to defendant, not that defendant was herself
negligent. We do not have to prove her negligence if
she is responsible for that of the gas company.

Collateral Negligence
(Brief of Appellant, pages 22-26)
The ultimate objective of the gas company and the
defendant Erma Ransdell under their contract "-as to
install the gas pipes and remove the propane lines safely
with the exercise of reasonable care. Under the pleading~
this was not done, but on the contrary the installation and
removal was negligently perforn1ed. This was not so
called "collateral" negligence. It was directly concerned
with the job the gas cmnpany was hired to do.
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The distinction between collateral negligence and
negligence for which an employer of an independent contractor is responsible is well pointed out in 2 Restatement

of the Law of Torts, Section 426, p. 1147:
"The negligence of a contractor in the course
of performing work entrusted to him by his employer, which does not make the result fall short
of that which it would be the employer's duty to
attain, had he done the work himself, is collateral
negligence."
ln the case at bar the negligence in installing and
removing gas pipes made the result fall short of that
which the gas company contracted to do in its contract
with the defendant Erma Ransdell. The gas company
::;hould have installed and removed with due care. The
illustration given further points up this distinction (p.

1147):
"A employs B, a competent contractor, to
excavate a cellar on land immediately adjoining
a public highway. The contract requires B to provide the fence necessary to prevent pedestrians
from falling into the excavation. A is liable to C,
a pedestrian, who falls into the excavation because
the fence as erected by B is flimsy or because B
has not erected the fence as his contract required.
A is not liable to D, a pedestrian hurt by the carelessness of B's worlanen in handling the timbers
while they are erecting the fence or by the careless
handling of tools while so doing."

Harper & James, The Law of Torts, page 1410,
Section 26.11, further points up this distinction:
2
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"Even where the employer's duty is nondelegable, however, and from whatever source the
nondelegable duty may be derived, the employer
will not be liable for negligence of the independent
contractor that is 'collateral' to the nondelegable
duty. The owner of a building may be under a
nondelegable duty to his invitees to use care to
keep it reasonably safe and he will be liable for a
defect negligently created or allowed to remain
by a builder called in to make repairs. But he will
not be liable to the invitee or the builder's negligence in dropping a tool on his head. Where the
duty is nondelegable because of the inherently
dangerous character of the work, conduct is 'collaterally negligent' when it does not involve the
risks that made the work peculiarly dangerous.
Painting a sign over the sidewalk and blasting
are examples of inherently dangerous tasks (within this rule). Yet if the painter or blaster negligently ran over a pedestrian on the highway while
bringing supplies to the job, his negligence would
be collateral, and the employer would not be vicariously liable for it."
It is obvious that the case of Callahan v. Salt Lake
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863, falls within the category
of collateral negligence. There the street contractor in
connection with its work of excavating the street, permitted dirt to fall into a gutter thus stopping the flow of
water which flooded plaintiff's property. The situation
is analogous to the builder's negligence in dropping a tool
on the head of a passerby, which is mentioned in the foregoing quotation from Harper & James.
In the case at bar if the gas company employee had
negligently hit s01neone with a tool or piece of pipe,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
defendant could escape liability, but that result does not
occur where the negligence is in the installation or removal itself.
In King v. Mason, (La.), 95 So. 2d 705, cited by
defendant, the independent contractor was employed by
the city to install a sewer. Incident to excavation work,
a gas line was cut. This distinguishes that case from the
one at bar. There was no occupant or possessor of premises who invited members of the general public into his
place of business and the independent contractor ha~
nothing to do with the installation or work on gas pipes.
If a dangerous gas could come from the sewer pipe and
it had been negligently installed so as to permit leakage
the cases would be the same.
The case of Schermerhorn v ..Metropolitan Gaslight
Co., 5 Daly 144, has nothing whatsoever to do with the
case at bar. The quotation from 18 Am. Jur., Electricity,
Section 58, is merely a general statement of the rule
relating to electricity which doesn't explode. Defendant
emphasizes some parts of that quotation, but fails to
emphasize the following:
"There are, however, circumstances under
which duties are imposed upon one which he cannot delegate to another."
The negligence here relied upon is the negligence in
the installation and removal of the pipes which proximately caused an explosion and does not include a situation where the gas service company dropped a hammer
on some one.
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We submit that the trial court properly ruled that
the negligence of the gas company was imputable to
defendant.
POINT II
DEFENDANT ERMA RANSDELL HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY.

In Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Company~
7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339 (1957) plaintiff, against whom
a summary judgment had been entered, contended he had
been denied a trial by jury. This Court said:
"We are in accord with the idea that the
right of trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded. This, of course, does not go so far as to
require the submission to a jury of issues of fact
merely because they are disputed. If they would
not establish a basis upon which plaintiff could
recover, no matter how they were resolved, it
would be useless to consume time, effort and expense in trying them, the saving of which is the
very purpose of summary judgment procedure.
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view
of the facts the plaintiff could recover. It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this court on
review, consider all of the evidence which plaintiff
is able to present, and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to him."
The purpose of a summary judgn1ent is well stated
in Ulibarri v. ChriJstenso·n, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170
(1954) :
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"The motion for summary judgment is for
the purpose of expediting procedure and obviating trials where no genuine issue of fact exists."
[n the case at bar whether or not the admitted negligence of the Gas Service Company was imputable to defendant is a matter of law as indicated under Point I
hereof. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact
for a jury to try.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HER ANSWER.

Whether or not defendant's motion to amend her
answer should have been granted or denied rested within
the discretion of the trial court. In its consideration of
this point this Court is limited to a determination of
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's motion.
Defendant admitted that the Utah Gas Service
Company negligently installed its gas pipes and negligently disconnected the propane gas lines at the Lariat
Cafe; further admitted the explosion and that the negligence of the Gas Service Company proximately caused
injuries to plaintiffs.
The defendant's motion was made after the argument for a summary judgment. Upon defendant making
her motion, plaintiff filed a certified copy of defendant's
complaint against the Utah Gas Service Company filed
in the United States District ·Court for the District of
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Utah (51-55). In the Federal Court action defendant here
was plaintiff there and in her complaint alleged as follows:
"3. That defendant, Utah Gas Service Company, is engaged in the business of distributing
natural gas, particularly in the area in and around
Monticello, San Juan County, Utah; that on and
before August 12, 1956, the defendant company
installed its gas lines in and to the Lariat Cafe
at Monticello, Utah for the purpose of selling
natural gas at said cafe.
"4. That at all times herein alleged, the
plain tiff was the owner of the premises and the
building known as the Lariat Cafe and the fixtures and equipment used therein in the restaurant and cafe business; and that the plaintiff at
all times alleged herein and up to and including
August 13, 1956, was engaged in the restaurant
and cafe business under the name of Lariat Cafe.
"5. That the defendant, Utah Gas Service
Company, negligently installed its gas lines and
negligently disconnected the propane gas lines at
the Lariat Cafe.
"6. That after the said installation of the
gas lines and the disconnection of the propane
gas lines as aforesaid and on the 13th day of
August, 1956, as a direct and proxilnate result of
the aforesaid negligent acts of the defendant, an
explosion occurred in the Lariat Cafe.
"7. That at the time of the said explosion,
plaintiff was working in the said Lariat Cafe in
the conduct of her regular business; that as a
direct and proximate result of the said negligent
acts of the defendants, plaintiff suffered serious
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physical injuries, including IDJUries to and loss
of the use of her right arm, permanent injury to
her right eye and to her brain, permanent scars
on her face, permanent injury to her left leg,
extreme physical shock to entire nervous system,
and that as a proximate result of said injuries
and of the said negligence of the defendant, the
plaintiff suffered and will continue to suffer
physical and mental pain and suffering, all to her
general damage in the amount of $100,000.00."
These are substantially the same allegations as contained in plaintiffs' complaint in the case at bar and
which defendant admitted. The trial court was certainly
justified in refusing to permit the defendant to play fast
and loose with the courts. Her right to recover was based
upon the negligence of the gas company and it was
within the trial court's discretion to refuse to permit the
defendant to back away from her solemn allegations and
admissions concerning the negligence of the gas company.
In any event the defendant still alleges that the gas
company was negligent in installing its pipes and as
heretofore indicated under Point I, this negligence is
imputable to defendant as a matter of law. The explosion, under the undisputed evidence, occurred inside the
cafe and wherever the leak came from it of necessity
entered the cafe. The negligent installation of a pipe
which could create this result would come within the
rule contended for by plaintiffs. Defendant's denial of
the interpretation of negligence in the proposed amendment is merely a denial of a conclusion of law which
must be resolved against defendant.
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We submit the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to amend her answer, not only for the reason
that it was not an abuse of discretion, but also for the
reason that the, amendment would have accomplished
nothing.
CONCLUSION
We submit that there was no genuine issue as to an;
material fact presented in this case once defendant admitted the negligence of the Gas Service Company and
that this negligence proximately caused the injuries and
death for which plaintiffs here seek to recover. The
question of imputing this negligence to defendant is a
matter of law and the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on the question of liability.
We submit that the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE~ ROBERTS
& BLACK
ADAMS, PETERSON & ANDERSON
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
Counsel for Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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